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MEDIATION AND ADJUDICATION,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND IDEOLOGY:
AN IMAGINARY CONVERSATION
Robert A. Baruch Bush *
I
This essay started out as an informal talk to a number of dispute
resolution colleagues concerning what I believe is a neglected and important
perspective on our field. 1 My goal here is to bring some attention to that
perspective, at two levels. First, I want to show that there is an underlying
ideological dimension to the ongoing controversy over adjudication and
mediation that accounts for a lot of the heat, if not a lot of the light, that goes
on in the discussion of these and other dispute resolution processes.2 Second,
I want to dig a bit deeper than I think most of us have dug so far to try to say
what that ideological dimension is, what the positions are that are being
staked out and struggled over. I am especially interested in clarifying what I
see as the ideological basis of the mediation
side of the argument, where I
3
think there has been little clarity to date.
Instead of approaching these goals through a formal or abstract
analysis, however, I intend to pursue them through imagining a story or
conversation which, as it were, gives voices to the different positions taken in
the controversy over mediation and adjudication. I invite the reader to listen
and respond to this conversation-as I myself will do later on.
The setting for the conversation is as follows. A judge has been
empowered by a state statute to refer cases from his civil docket to
mediation. 4 The statute says that he can, in his discretion, refer any and all
cases; the decision is his, and the parties cannot refuse mediation without
showing good cause. The judge can send all his cases to mediation on a
blanket basis, or certain categories of cases, or individual cases on a case by
case basis, whichever he decides. This is what the statute empowers him to
do, and the Supreme Court has set up rules enabling him and other judges to
do it. The problem is that the judge is uncertain how to exercise this new
power. He has no clear idea which cases, if any, he should refer to the
mediation process.
So, he picks six representative cases from his civil docket: a divorce
case with a custody question, a complex commercial litigation, a
landlord-tenant case, a discrimination suit, a consumer case, and a personal
injury litigation. He sends copies of the case files, with names deleted, to
four individuals who are friends or associates: his law clerk, his court
administrator, his former law professor, and a practicing mediator who is a
friend of his. The judge asks each of them for their advice. Should he send
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any of these cases to mediation? All of them? None of them? What should he
do?
He is a bit startled when he gets back the results of this survey,
because he gets four completely different recommendations. From the law
professor, he gets the recommendation that he should send no cases to
mediation; all the cases should stay in court. The law clerk gives him a more
complex recommendation.
He says that the discrimination case, the
consumer case, and the personal injury case should be kept in court, but the
divorce, the landlord-tenant, and the commercial cases should go to
mediation.
The court administrator says he should send them all to
mediation, unless both parties to the dispute object; if both parties object, he
shouldn't refer them to mediation, whatever the type of case. Finally, the
mediator tells him that he should send all the cases to mediation, whether or
not the parties object.
The judge is puzzled by this set of responses. Why the divergence in
the recommendations; what's going on here? What is the argument that these
people obviously must have among one another in order to give him these very
different recommendations? Do they have some kind of factual or technical
argument about the feasibility of sorting out cases, and referring some to
court and some to mediation?5 Or do they have some kind of ideological
argument over the importance and universality of different dispute resolution
goals and processes? Clearly, all his advisors think that his decision shouldn't
simply be arbitrary, that whatever he does will have important consequences.
But, what are they? What is at stake in the decision that he and other judges
6
have to make as to which, if any, of these disputes to refer to mediation?
II
Faced with these questions, the judge does what judges are very good
at doing. He calls all four advisors and says, "I'd like you to argue this out in
front of me. I want to hear what you have to say in the presence of one
another. That way you can present the reasons for your recommendations,
and I can hear some kind of response from you towards one another."
So, the four advisors come together with the judge in an informal
meeting over lunch. The court administrator goes first. "Judge," she begins,
"I'll tell you the reason for my recommendation. As far as I'm concerned, the
most important goal we have here is saving time and money. That's the main
goal that we want to keep in mind in using your powers under this new
mediation statute. I suspect that was the legislature's main reason for
enacting this law. The courts are heavily backlogged, delay is epidemic, and
adding
new
judges
and
courtrooms
appears
fiscally-and
politically-impossible. Settlements are the only solution. Settling cases is
going to save public and private expense. It's also going to increase public
satisfaction with the system. 7 Now, since all cases have some potential to
settle," she continues, "and we don't know which ones will and which ones
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won't, it makes sense to refer them all to mediation, unless we have a clear
indication in advance that there's no real settlement possibility. For example,
if both parties show a clear desire not to go to mediation, not to negotiate,
then in that case it makes no sense to waste the time." She concludes, "That's
the reason for my recommendation. Refer to mediation, unless it's clear that
there's opposition on both sides to settlement."
The law clerk then is called upon. He says, "Judge, as you know, I
disagree, and the reason for my recommendation is the following. In my view,
the main goal is not saving time and money, regardless of what the legislature
may have had in mind. There are other goals of dispute resolution that are
much more important.
"Generally, it seems to me," the law clerk continues, "protecting
individual rights and ensuring some kind of substantive fairness to both sides
in the resolution of the dispute are the most important goals. And where
rights and substantive fairness are most important, adjudication in court is
the best tool we have to accomplish those goals.8 However, there are cases
where rights and fairness are not the only or the most important goals. For
example, if there is an ongoing relationship between the parties, preserving
that relationship may be very important both to the parties and to the public.
In that case, mediation would be desirable, because preserving relationships
is something that mediation does much better than the adjudication process.
Therefore, I think that you can distinguish between cases on the basis of the
ongoing relationship factor. When you have such a relationship, refer to
mediation; otherwise, keep the case in court. That's the way I've split up the
cases you sent us. I'm not sure that it's immediately obvious from the way
I've divided them, but that was my criterion, and I think it's the best one for
you to use."
Next it is the mediator's turn. "I both agree and disagree with the
administrator and the law clerk, your Honor," she explains. "Saving time and
money must be considered important and preserving relationships, in certain
cases, is also a very important goal.l But both of these are really just part of
a more general goal that I consider the most important aim of dispute
resolution: that is, to reach the best possible substantive result or solution to
the parties' problem. Sometimes the best solution will be one that saves the
parties time and money; sometimes it will be one that preserves their
relationship. Sometimes it will be one that does neither of these. That will all
depend on many details of the case.
"But whatever the details, there is plenty of evidence now that in
terms of achieving the best results for the individual case in question
mediation is a process that has tremendous advantages over adjudication. 1
The process is flexible, issues can be framed more effectively and discussed
more fully, a greater variety of possible solutions can be considered, and
unique, innovative and integrative solutions are possible, even likely.
Therefore, mediation ought to be tried first in all cases because the potential
to arrive at superior substantive results is always greater in mediation than
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in adjudication. If mediation doesn't work, if there's no resolution, then the
parties can go back to court. But, in the first instance, achieving superior
results is the most important goal to strive for in every single case. And
mediation is the best vehicle we have for doing this.
That's why I
recommended referring all your cases to mediation, without exceptions."
Finally the law professor speaks. "Your Honor," he begins, "I'm sorry
to have to disagree. But all of your other friends here have missed the point.
I say this because they're all talking about goals that don't really pertain to
your function, the function of a court. A court is a public institution, and the
goal of a court as a public institution is not to save time and money; nor is it
to help private parties secure private benefits in individual cases. Your goal
as a public institution is to promote important public values. 12 That ought to
be your primary concern: the promotion and the securing of important public
values through the dispute resolution process. That is what distinguishes
your function from that of a mere private arbitrator, and
13 justifies the public
support-legal and fiscal-given uniquely to the courts.
"I submit to you, your Honor, that the most important public values at
stake in dispute resolution are basically four. There may be others; but I
think that these four have widely been recognized as the most important
ones. 14 First is the protection of the fundamental civil rights of the parties as
individuals. Second is the pursuit of substantive or social justice, as between
different classes represented by the parties in the case, and especially as
between rich and poor, strong and weak, haves and have-nots. Third is the
promotion of what the economists call efficiency-that is, the greatest possible
level of aggregate societal welfare-through encouragement of activities that
make the best use of our limited societal resources. And fourth is the
establishment and articulation of public values that give us a sense of social
solidarity in our society as a whole, which is of course a very pluralistic one
and therefore requires the cement of shared values. To repeat, your Honor,
the public values a court must concern itself with are: protection of
fundamental individual rights, provision of social justice, promotion of
economic welfare, and creation of social solidarity.
"Your Honor," the professor continues, "adjudication serves every one
of these values. It does so because it operates by using and generating both
procedural and substantive rules-using them in the instant case, and
generating them for future cases.15 Indeed the rules themselves are often
related to and based upon these values. Substantive rules promote economic
16
welfare by signalling economic actors how to use resources efficiently.
Substantive and procedural rules promote social justice by reducing the
17
advantage of the powerful, in the aggregate and in the individual case.
Procedural rules protect directly against violations of fundamental civil
rights. 18 And substantive rules foster solidarity by giving meaning to shared,
public values. 19 Therefore, the rule-based, public adjudication process is an
excellent-an unparalleled-instrument for accomplishing these values.
Mediation, on the other hand, weakens and undermines every single one of
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these values. Why? Because, simply, it neither uses in the instant case nor
generates for the future rules, whether procedural or substantive, based on
these values or any other values. Mediation rests solely on the expedient of
compromise. 20 Therefore it cannot help but undermine all of these important,
rule-dependent values.
'This brings me to the heart of my argument, your Honor," says the
professor. "First, we can't sacrifice public values of this stature solely to save
time and money. Certainly, we can't do so as a matter of public policy. If, as
a matter of necessity, the courts can't handle all cases, that's one thing. But
to adopt a public policy saying that values like rights protection and social
justice are less important than saving money and judicial economy would be
inexcusable. Second, there's no way of neatly dividing uP cases on the basis
that some involve these public values and others do not. 1 That simply isn't
true. All six of the kinds of cases that you submitted to us involve one or more
of these public values. Indeed, most of them involve several. The same would
be true for any other disputes we might examine." Here the professor went
into a lengthy analysis of how this was so, which for the sake of brevity we will
not reproduce. 22 'Therefore," he concluded, " 'channelling' of different cases to
different processes is undesirable.
"Finally, you cannot, as the mediator suggested, consider the value of
better results for the parties in the individual case superior to these public
values. You cannot do so, your Honor, as a matter of public policy. Why not?
Because this would be to put private benefit over public values over the
public good, and as a public servant you cannot legitimately do so.2D And I'm
sure you would not want to. Therefore, even if results are superior in
mediation in individual cases, that is no basis for a public policy of mandating
cases to mediation. In fact, I would say the same about referrals, incentives,
or any other form of public encouragement of this mediation process. The
arguments I've made cut against any kind of public support for mediation. If
private parties want to go to a mediator, let that be their decision as a matter
of private choice. 24 I'm not sure how I feel about that, but in any event that's
not the issue here. As a matter of public policy, we cannot put private benefit
over the public good. Therefore, your Honor, I say all of these cases should
remain in court, unless perhaps a petition is submitted by both parties to
adjourn pending voluntarily initiated settlement discussions or mediation."
The judge pauses to digest the different comments, and then replies
by, as it were, thinking out loud. "You know," he says, "the professor's 'public
values' argument is very persuasive to me as a judge. It does seem that for a
public servant, which is ultimately what I am, the choice between
adjudication and mediation is either a question of public values versus
expediency, or public values versus private benefit to individual disputants.
Unless, of course, we can split the cases up in some rational way. In other
words, do we really have to take a unitary approach, or can we somehow take
a pluralistic approach and rationally assign cases to different processes? The
professor argues that it is probably very difficult, if not impossible, to identify
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cases where no public values are involved. Right now, I'm inclined to agree
with him. So, I'm really persuaded by the professor's argument, on all three
points: Public values have to prevail, only adjudication can achieve them, and
since all cases involve public values, they all should be handled in court
rather than through mediation."
Before the judge has a chance to adjourn and consider the arguments
more thoroughly, however, the mediator asks the judge for one more minute.
"Judge," she says, "I have another point to make. The reason I didn't make it
before is that it's a little hard to articulate. But I see I will have to try. The
truth is that the concern for better results in individual cases is not all that
makes mediation important, in my view, even though I admit that most
advocates of mediation emphasize this as the primary advantage of
mediation. But there's more involved, and it goes far beyond expediency and
private benefit. When I say mediation ought to be used in all these cases, my
reason is also based on promoting public values, public values which are
important to all of the cases you sent us, public values different from and
more important than the ones that the professor mentioned. In other words,
like the professor's argument for adjudication, my argument for mediation is
also a public values argument, but it is based on a different view of public
values than the view he presented.
"Now, my problem is that it is hard to articulate clearly what these
different public values are. I think they're evoked or implied by concepts like
reconciliation, social harmony, community, interconnection, relationship, and
the like. 25 Mediation does produce superior results, as I argued earlier. But
it also involves a non-adversarial process that is less traumatic, more
humane, and far more capable of healing and reconciliation than adjudication.
Those are the kinds of concerns that make me feel that these cases ought to be
handled in mediation, not for private benefit reasons and not for expediency
reasons, but because of these reconciliatory public values promoted by
mediation."
Before the judge can comment, the law professor responds, "At least
you recognize the priority of public values; but your argument is
incomprehensible! 26 Exactly what are you talking about here, with terms like
'reconciliation', 'harmony', 'relationship'? All of them seem connected to cases
with ongoing relationships, but we've already said that such relationships
don't exist in all these cases. In any event, preserving such relationships is
not really a public value; it is a private benefit to the parties, so you're back to
the private benefit argument. Even if preserving relationships can somehow
be considered a public value, do you really mean to suggest that it is more
important, in all these cases, than all of the rest of these public concerns
combined? That is quite a remarkable claim!"
The judge concurs, "Yes, it is an extraordinary claim, and not at all
clear. What exactly is this public value underlying mediation, if it is in fact a
public value, and why is it so important that you think it outweighs all these
well-recognized values put forth by the professor?"
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III
Let us pause for a minute from this story. The conversation to this
point should be familiar to many readers as a parallel to the state of the
adjudication/mediation debate today. You can probably identify for yourself
in the conversation the voices of the various participants in this debate. For
example, the law professor is the voice of judges and academics, such as, for
example, Owen Fiss, Judith Resnik, Harry Edwards, all of whom take
positions similar in one respect or another to those taken by the professor in
this conversation. 2 7
I call them the adjudication advocates, or the
adjudication orthodoxy. 28 The administrator in this story gives voice to
another group composed primarily of judges and judicial administrators. The
most famous of these is probably former Chief Justice Warren Burger, but
many others are found in the literature. I call them the judicial economy
advocates, or more succinctly, the pragmatists. The law clerk, who probably
took an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) course in law school, represents
the voice of a number of academics and ADR practitioners, such as Frank
Sander, Eric Green Carrie Menkel-Meadow, among others, whom I call the
"process pluralists'.3o These are people who say, "You can and should match
different processes with different disputes; you must simply be clever enough
to figure out a rational way to do it." Of course, none of these people are
one-dimensional, like the law clerk here, in their analysis of relevant choice
factors, focusing only on the relationship factor. Their approach is more
careful and systematic. Finally, the voice of the mediator represents the voice
of some practitioners and a few academics as well, for example Andrew
McThenia, Thomas Shaffer, and myself. 3 1 I call this group the mediation
advocates, or the mediation orthodoxy. I also note that, just as the mediator
spoke with two voices, one stressing private benefit32and one public values, a
similar dualism can be seen in mediation advocates.
As for the present status of the debate among these groups in the
actual field, it is closely reflected in the story up to this point: First, the
adjudication orthodoxy thus far remains unshaken in theory. No one has
advanced a good theoretical argument against the public values argument of
the adjudication orthodoxy. 33 Nor has anyone, despite theoretical efforts,
constructed a sound and practicable method of channelling cases to
processes. 34 Second, notwithstanding this theoretical impregnability, the
adjudication orthodoxy is failing in practice. Despite the persuasive public
value arguments in favor of adjudication, mediation and ADR are spreading
anyway, and they are spreadinf primarily because of the reasons of the
pragmatists, namely expediency.
Third, there is a small, hesitant, and not
very clear voice being raised to argue for mediation on a public value basis,
although this argument has been summarily 6 dismissed by the adjudication
orthodoxy and simply ignored by most others.3
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Given the state of the debate right now, what are the prospects for the
immediate future in the use of adjudication and mediation? What are judges
like the one in the story here likely to do? I think there are three possible
scenarios. First-and most likely, despite the good intentions of the judge in
our story-expediency and private interest may rule. Mediation will be used
widely, and perhaps indiscriminately, to reduce court caseload and to satisfy
private disputants' individual needs. Second, and less likely, if expediency
and private benefits are rejected as justifications for ADR, then the public
values argument could lead to rejection of mediation generally and
retrenchment back to adjudication in court as the primary way of resolving
disputes. Mediation may be used, but limited and controlled, as a necessary
evil, and more resources would be sPent on improving and increasing access to
justice, meaning access to court. 3 Third, and least likely, if a clear and
persuasive public value argument can be articulated on behalf of mediation,
perhaps in a
then in all likelihood mediation will spread more widely-but
38
different form than the private-benefitlexpediency version.
The present debate over adjudication and mediation therefore has two
dimensions.
One is the public-value versus private-benefit/expediency
dimension. In this dimension, adjudication represents important public values
and mediation represents private self-interest and public expediency. No one
doubts the seriousness of this clash, but it is a clash over whether the public
good matters, not what the public good is. It is not the heart of the matter.
The second dimension is the public-value versus public-value dimension, and
it is reflected in the conflict between the adjudication orthodoxy and the
mediation orthodoxy-here, between the professor and the mediator, given
the mediator's second, public-value argument (to be explored further below).
In this dimension, both adjudication and mediation represent public values,
and the question is which public values are more important. This is a clash
over what the public good is, a clash of social vision or ideology. 39 It is this

dimension that I believe accounts for the passion on both sides of the
argument. This is the dimension of the debate that I am most interested in,
and to which the conversation started above is about to proceed.
The suggestion of that conversation is, quite correctly I think, that the
burden of persuasion is now on the mediation orthodoxy-the mediator.
Why? Because the law professor's argument is a very clear argument. The
values he presents are well-articulated, and they are well-discussed in the
larger field. The mediator's public-value arguments, on the other hand-in
this story and in the field at large-have been rather vague up to this point,
and therefore unpersuasive. In short, in our conversation, and in the field at
large, the judge's question to the mediator stands: "What is the specific claim
that you're making on behalf of some important public value supported by
mediation? And why is that value, if it exists at all, superior to the kind of
public values that the professor was referring to as supported by the
adjudication process?" This is the dimension of the debate which must now be
more clearly addressed. However, instead of addressing it in the abstract, let
us again turn to our story.
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IV
The judge repeats his question to the mediator: "What exactly is this
public value underlying mediation, if it is in fact a public value, and why is it
so important that you think it outweighs all these well-recognized values put
forth by the professor?"
In response, the mediator says something that I think many
mediation advocates have said, at least privately, but which they have not
said clearly enough or strongly enough in public discussion. She replies,
"Judge, I can't answer that question in a vacuum. I can't answer that
question abstractly sitting here in this room. Instead, I would like you and
the professor to come and observe a mediation with
40 me. In that context, I'm
going to be able to answer your question, I'm sure."
"Is this really necessary?" the professor asks. "We all know what
mediation is."
'"ell," responds the mediator, "that's just it, Professor. Mediation
isn't monolithic. There are a number of quite different kinds or versions of
mediation being practiced; and my argument-my public value
argument-rests squarely on one of those versions. I could certainly describe
this kind of mediation to you. 41 But what I want to convey to you is not so
much how it works, but what its effects are-because that's where the public
value lies. And I think the best way to convey those effects to you is to show
you an actual mediation."
So that's what they do. All three of them go, and somehow-although
the logistical difficulties of this are quite staggering-observe the mediation.
To be specific, they observe the landlord-tenant case that the judge had
recently pulled from his files. It involved a dispute about rent owed or not
owed, repairs that had or had not been made, the landlord's desire to have the
42
tenant vacate the premises, claims of "harassment" on both sides, and so on.
In the course of a 2 1/2-hour mediation session, the case is ultimately
resolved, with an agreement to pay some but not all of the money by the
tenant, an agreement to fix some but not all of the repairs by the landlord, an
agreement on how much time the tenant could stay before he would
voluntarily vacate the apartment, and an agreement on how the parties would
communicate with one another in the meantime. After the parties and the
mediator of the case leave, then our mediator, the judge, and the professor sit
down together.
Before the mediator can say a word, the professor jumps in: "Look, you
don't have to say anything! What we just saw proved my point! In this
session every single one of the public values that I have talked about was
undermined. The landlord, who had the economic advantage to start with,
was able to take advantage of the concessions that have to be made in this
kind of a process, to increase the inequities between himself and the tenant.
In other words, the rich got richer, and the poor got poorer. So social justice
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was undermined in this case; and it will be undermined in the future, because
all landlords are going to take advantage of this kind of thing. The landlord
was also able to escape having to obey clear laws which articulate public
policies about maintaining housing stock-who should be responsible for
repairs, who can more effectively and economically keep housing in good
repair, and so on. He doesn't have to obey any of those laws. Why? Because
he can come to a process like this. He can do it today, and he can do it in the
future, and other landlords can do the same. Therefore the goal of
husbanding of our scarce resources for maximum social welfare is also
undermined here.
"Procedurally, neither the landlord nor the tenant, as I saw it, knew
what was going on here. The mediator was meeting separately with each
party in 'caucuses', without the other party present. Who knows what was
said? Who knows whether confidentialities were disclosed? Whatever the
mediator said, the parties didn't have attorneys; there were no rules of
evidence. The rights of both parties could easily have been violated in this
case by the manipulations of the mediator in an unsupervised and secret
process, so the goal of rights protection was undermined. Finally, whatever
happened here, you certainly have to say it was private, it was secret. If there
was some important public principle that emerged here, no one will ever know
about it. It offers no basis for building a sense of shared4 public values, and
therefore undermines the goal of creating social solidarity.
"So, as far as I'm concerned, what we just saw here makes my case
open and shut. This was true in this case. It would be just as true in all the
others. None of these cases-nor any other-belongs in this kind of a
process."
The mediator takes this in for a few minutes, and the judge is waiting
for her response.
Finally, the mediator says, "Professor, you're right.
Everything that you say happened here, I will agree, happened as you say. I
could argue with you about it-or about what might have happened in court
instead. But, I don't want to get into that argument, at least not today. 4 4 So
let's say that I agree with you completely. However-and here's my whole
point-what you described is not all that happened here. I saw some other
things happen here that you apparently didn't
see, or that you didn't see as
45
being important, even if you did see them.
"For example," the mediator continues, "I saw that at some point in
this process each party, the landlord and the tenant, realized that he could do
something for himself regarding the problem that brought him into the
dispute. In other words, the parties realized their own power to do something
for themselves about their situation, even if it was not exactly what their
rights would be legally. The landlord saw that he could, in fact, get his
premises back so that he could rent to somebody else. The landlord saw that
he could in fact get some economic return, whereas at the moment he was
getting nothing from the tenant's use of his premises. The tenant, on the
other hand, saw that he could get a substantial amount of time to find
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another place to live, which he wanted because he did not want to move
immediately. And the tenant also saw that he could have the premises made
somewhat more habitable in the meantime by getting certain repairs done.
Both parties realized, during this process, that they could accomplish all these
things through their own mutual efforts and agreements, without having to
appeal to or rely upon any outside institution.
"Second, I saw that at some point in the session, possibly even at
several points, each party, having come to this realization or increased
awareness of his own power, was able to let go of his preoccupation with his
own individual concerns and to go beyond those concerns. Each was able to
transcend his narrow self-interest, to realize and recognize-even if only
fleetingly-some element of legitimacy in the other side's position, some
element of common humanity with the other party.
'Tor example, at a certain point it was obvious that the landlord
suddenly realized that the tenant was not a cheat, not irresponsible, as the
landlord originally charged, but was in fact needy and deserving of the help
he was asking for. Whether or not the landlord felt that he could respond and
meet those needs, he saw that they were not unfounded and frivolous
requests. The tenant, on the other hand, saw that the landlord, however cruel
he may have sometimes appeared in the past, was not really vindictive, but
was in fact frustrated himself, and pressured by various kinds of external
forces that had nothing to do with the tenant. Therefore, the tenant realized
something of the landlord's situation, even if it was not something he was
responsible for or could do anything about.
"And one more thing. The parties had apparently communicated very
poorly in the past, with each regarding the other as being abusive. But in
today's session I saw each party realize that the other wasn't necessarily
being abusive after all, but might simply have been reacting to the pressures
of the situation, or communicating in a style that the other fellow wasn't used
to. So, in all these ways, I saw each party let go of his focus on himself and
instead recognize the other party's situation as having some basic human
legitimacy.
"Now all this may have helped to accomplish the resolution that
occurred here," the mediator goes on, "but that's not my point. My point is
that both parties were transformed by what went on in this session, in two
ways: in terms of their level of self-awareness and capacity for
self-determination, and in terms of their level of other-awareness and their
capacity for consideration and respect for others. And that itself is the public
value that mediation promotes. In other words, going through this mediation
was, for both parties, a direct education and growth experience, as to
self-determination on the one hand and consideration for others on the other.
But, your Honor, I'm not focusing on any private benefit the parties may have
derived from this. As a matter of fact, if it came to that, the parties probably
wouldn't have chosen this 'education' as a matter of private benefit if they had
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been offered it in the first place. 4 6 My point is the public value involved here.
"How can I define this public value? Simply put, it is the value of
providing a moral and political education for citizens, in responsibility for
themselves and respect for others.4 7 In a democracy, your Honor, that must
be considered a crucial public value and it must be considered a public
function. 4 8 As far as I'm concerned, there's the potential for that kind of
direct and experiential education in every single one of these cases that you
sent to us; and that potential can only be realized in mediation. 49 It cannot be
accomplished in adjudication. In adjudication, the things the professor saw
here might not have occurred; but, neither would any of the things I have just
described. In my view, this civic education value is more important than the
values that the professor is concerned about. Therefore, even if those other
values were sacrificed here-which I have allowed for the sake of argument,
though I might dispute that too-it was worth it. It was worth it for the
unique civic education, so essential in a democracy, that the parties were
given. And, by the way, your Honor, even if the parties had reached no
agreement in mediation, that education could still have occurred anyway.
The case could then have gone back to court where those other values could
have been dealt with as secondary matters.
Finally, I just want to clarify an important connection between my
argument here and our earlier discussion. On reflection, I've realized that the
'superior results' argument that I mentioned at our first meeting is also
based, at least in part, on the public value I'm talking about here. That is,
many of us place value on the integrative, 'win/win' solutions that mediation
helps produce precisely because such solutions embody in concrete terms the
kind of respect for others that is the essence of the civic education value. So
the 'superiority' of results we speak of is not only, or primarily, that the
results better serve the individual interests of the parties-a private
benefit-but that they express each individual's considered choice to respect
and accommodate the other to some degree-a democratic public value. In
short, both the experience of the mediation process and the kind of results it
produces serve the50 public value of civic education in self-determination and
respect for others.
"Your Honor, thanks for coming to watch the mediation, and for
hearing me out. That's my case."
At the conclusion of the mediator's words, the judge and the professor
are, one might say, shocked into silence for a moment. The professor is the
first to regain his voice. He responds, "What are you talking about? How is
this education a public value? This is just more of the same thing: better
results, moral education, personal transformation. That's fine for the parties!
But what about the public? I don't see how this education, even assuming it
occurred, is a public benefit. And even if it is, why is it more important than
social justice, than the protection of rights? You've given us no different and
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more important public values here; you've only given us more private interest,
51
however refined it may be."

V
With the argument at a full stop for the moment, the judge calls an
end to the meeting, and all depart. After the meeting, while the judge is
thinking this all out, he happens to meet another friend of his at a conference.
This friend is also a judge, from a European country, over in the States for the
conference. The two judges go out to dinner. Naturally, our judge regales his
friend with the whole story recounted above, leading up to and concluding
with the episode of the mediation and the mediator's last argument. And then
he asks her, "What do you make of that?"
The European judge sips on her coffee and answers, 'Well, I see the
mediator's point. But I think I also see why you don't see it. To see her
point, my friend, you have to move yourself out of your own American
perspective, your legal tradition as the comparativists call it. 52 The professor
is really speaking from the heart of that tradition; and his goals, which are
your tradition's goals, are all based upon a certain underlying premise. The
premise is that autonomous individual choice, and therefore the freedom of
the individual to accomplish his own self-fulfillment, defined in his own
terms, is the highest value in the social enterprise. 53 All of the other public
values he's talking about serve that ultimate highest value of individual
autonomy and self-fulfillment. Fundamental rights are important because
they protect the individual's autonomous choice against the state. Social
justice is important because it protects the individual's autonomous choice
against other possibly more powerful individuals or groups. Maximizing
social welfare is intimately connected with autonomy, because it equates
individual autonomous choice with the public good. That's the whole concept
of efficiency in classical economics: the equation of self-interest with the
public good that occurs through the operation of private markets. Finally,
solidarity is crucially important in this system, because something has to hold
the whole structure together in the presence of so much individual autonomy.
Solidarity is the cement that holds everything together.
"The professor's public values," she continues, "are therefore crucial
for the promotion of individual choice and fulfillment, which is the ultimate
value of the enterprise. This is why they are public values, given the
individualist premise. Given the same premise, moral development-the
mediator's value-is not crucial at all. Moral development is simply one
private vision of the good, which individuals ought to be able to choose or
reject, as they see fit. It's certainly not a public good. The public value is
protection of the individual's right to choose that private vision of the good or
to reject it. That's the logic of the professor's argument and his critique of the
mediator's case. It makes perfect sense-given its premise.
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self-determination and consideration for others (we might also call it
self-transcendence)-is perhaps not as familiar a value in your tradition as in
ours. In any event, it seems to me that it is based on a completely different
underlying premise. That premise is that the highest values of the social
enterprise are these two: first, the fulfillment of the individual's capacity for
moral development, for going beyond self-interest and being concerned with
others; and second, the discovery of a common good beyond any private vision
of the good, through the encounter between self and others in shared political
discourse and action. 5 4 Education in self-determination and consideration for
others-the mediator's value-is crucial for the promotion of individual moral
development and the shared search for a common good. From this perspective,
it is therefore clearly a public value. You see, my friend, the mediator's
argument also makes sense, given this different premise."
The European judge pauses to let her point sink in. Then she
continues, "Now, these different premises about the ultimate value of the
social enterprise go very, very deep. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that
they rest on entirely different views of the nature of the individual and the
nature of society. 55 On the one hand, there is the view that the individual is
an agent of will, free to satisfy himself in any terms he chooses, without any
external standard of judgment, and that society is merely a neutral facilitator
(or referee) of that process of individual satisfaction. On the other hand, there
is the view that the individual is an agent of reflection, challenged by some
implicit common standard to enlarge himself by connecting to and serving
others, and that society is an encouraging educator in that developmental
process.
"To repeat my earlier point, given the second view of the nature of the
individual and society, self-determination and self-transcendence, the
mediator's values, are crucial public values in the dispute resolution system
and in the social enterprise generally. 5 6 This is so for two reasons. First,
private choice is almost certainly insufficient to further those values.
57
Education of this kind is almost always a necessarily public function.
Second, and more important, the whole purpose of the state or society, by this
vision, is not simply to facilitate individual choice and satisfaction but to
produce moral individuals and to find the common good. That's the purpose of
If so, then promoting self-determination and
the whole enterprise.
self-transcendence is a public value because these qualities are needed in
order to achieve that ultimate social purpose. A public, not a private, motive
underlies the mediator's case, as well as the professor's.
'moral and political education of citizens in
"In explaining
self-determination and self-transcendence' as a public value," the European
judge adds, 'let me clarify that I'm not talking about a religious function
here-unless it is what has been called the civil religion of58the traditional civic
virtues that is now being rediscovered in many quarters."
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The European judge concludes, "I do understand, my friend, that to
see the mediator's case as I am putting it, you have to shift your entire view of
the individual and society. But that is just my point. Both the professor and
the mediator base their arguments on public values, and on a view of the
public good. But they are operating from two, perhaps diametrically opposed,
views of the public good. In other words, as I see it, the professor and the
mediator are not only arguing over mediation versus adjudication; they're
arguing about the character and the purpose of social life in its entirety. This
isn't a mere technical argument between two parties who share the same
basic view of the world; it is an ideological 5alrument, about which of two very
different views of the world should prevail." 7'
VI
Let us take another pause. What we have now in the story is a
parallel of yet another debate that we can see in a much larger field.
Although this debate has not surfaced explicitly in the dispute resolution
field, that's where I want to put it right now. The debate is explicit in fields
such as political, moral and legal philosophy as reflected in the recent
literature. However, the connection to the dispute resolution debate is not
hard to see. I want to clarify that connection by identifying voices from those
fields with the voices from our conversation about mediation and adjudication.
The voice of the professor, at least as the European judge reads him, is the
voice of philosophers like Rawls, Dworkin, Nozick, and those who write in this
general tradition (although from quite divergent viewpoints), whom we could
call rights-based liberals or individualists. 60 The voice of the mediator, again
as the European judge reads her, is the voice of others like Carol Gilligan,
Michael Sandel, Alisdair MacIntyre, Ian Macneill, who present what we could
call a communitarian or relational vision of society. 61 The language of some
of this latter group directly points to the values of self-determination and
self-transcendence voiced by the mediator. Macneil, for example, writes 'The
foundation of community lies in the principle of sacrifice to others," 0 and
"The core of the community vision is the elevation ...

of duty, reciprocity and

63
belonging to a position of prime importance in all of human existence."
My point in comparing these voices to those in our story is to highlight
the importance and the character of the ideological dimension of current
discussions of dispute resolution processes. Once the public-value argument
for mediation is fully stated and set against the public-value argument for
adjudication, it becomes clear that the adjudication/mediation debate derives
from a much deeper debate between the liberal/individualist and the
communitarian/relationalist visions of society. 64 As the European judge
observed, this is not simply a debate about dispute resolution. It is a debate
about the vision of society that we hold. This is the ideological dimension of
the debate; and in my view, these are the particular ideologies that are

contending.65
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I am aware that this ideological argument has been presented here as
an either/or choice, at both the large and small levels. The mediator and the
professor imply that we can have one set of public values or the other, but not
both. The European judge poses a similar choice between the relational and
individualistic visions in toto. Such stark choices may seem unnecessary and
even false; it may instead seem possible and preferable to integrate the
visions and processes in question. However, even if this may eventually be
possible, I think it is difficult at present to imagine and articulate what such
an integration would look like. In the meantime, my belief is that by
highlighting the contrast between the alternatives-the two processes and
visions-each can be more fully understood. It will be far easier to envision
an integration if we have a deep grasp of each of the elements to be joined. So
I see a need now for sharp definition and distinction, for clarification of what
each side of the argument stands for. What we learn66from this will help us
discover whether integration is possible, and if so how.
To return to and conclude our conversation, what are the practical
implications of this ideological reading of the mediation/adjudication debate?
In particular, what additional advice does this reading suggest we might want
to offer the judge in our story? In answer to this question, I want to exercise a
little poetic license and jump into the conversation myself, to speak directly to
this judge.
VII
Based on what we have heard from the others so far, I would say,
"Judge, you're asking what kind of choice you should make, as between
keeping cases in court and referring them to mediation. But it's clear to me
and I hope it's clear to you that you have a deeper choice to make here: a
choice between different social visions. If you accept the prevailing
individualist vision, Judge, then you should reject mediation completely, or
limit it very severely, to ensure that public values like those advocated by the
professor are not undermined. Therefore, don't refer cases to mediation, if
that's your position; or refer them to a legalized or controlled version of
mediation that is not going to undermine these values, one that has
protections for the parties, objective standards to evaluate settlement results,
and so on. 6 7 On the other hand, if you accept the relational vision, then you
should not merely use mediation; you should expand it to ensure the
accomplishment of the most important public values under that vision.
Therefore, you should refer all your cases
to mediation, but with an important
68
proviso that I'll mention in a minute.
"But, whatever you do, your Honor, you as a public servant should not
use mediation at all, if you're going to use it simply as a tool for saving time
and satisfying private litigants' individual interests, because this will
undermine both of the contending visions. 6 9 So your decision is not just a
dispute resolution decision; it is an ideological decision. Should a judge be
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making such a decision? I don't know. But you've been given the power, and
in fact you are going to make it whatever you decide to do.
"I also want you to realize that you're going to make this decision
right now in a context which includes little if any reflection on this level of the
decision-making process in the mediation referral question. No one is
seriously considering the ideological dimension. That is why the conversation
we've heard here exploring this dimension is, indeed, just an imaginary
conversation at this point. In reality, the general trend today is a blind run to
mediation for mere expediency reasons; 70 that's what prevails, and that's the
tide you're going to be fighting, if you do anything different. At the same
time, there's also a blind reaction against this trend, which demands a
retrenchment to the courts, a refusal to mediate cases, a reassertion of the
superiority of adjudication by restricting or legalizing mediation. 7 1 In short,
mediation-as the mediator presented it to you-is either being co-opted or
rejected entirely. No real attention has been given to the relational vision,
and the potential of mediation as a transformative instrument, a means of
civic education.
"Despite these trends, my recommendation to you is that you explore
this alternative vision, that you consider it very seriously. You may ask, what
would this look like, this educational vision of mediation-and society-that
I'm suggesting to you?
"Actually, there is an example I can give you of a system that adopts
this approach, a very ancient example. It is sometimes cited by dispute
resolution scholars today; but it is not always very well understood or grasped
by them. It is the traditional principle of the rabbinical court system on
choosing dispute resolution processes, as regulated by the Talmud. According
to the Code of Maimonides, the rabbinical court must, in every civil case, try
to persuade the parties to agree to a compromise settlement rather than seek
formal adjudication of the case. 7 2 The procedure used by the rabbinical court
to effectuate a settlement is, in its essence, a mediation process, with the
court itself taking the role of mediator. 73 This principle is not limited by any
type of case or by any types of parties. It is a universal principle7 of
4 preference
for mediation over adjudication as a means of resolving disputes.
'The fact that it is a universal principle, Judge, and the commentaries
on this provision in the code, suggest that one of the primary rationales
behind it in that system is very close to the one the mediator offered when she
spoke to you. It is based on the value of encouraging individuals to expand
their narrow self-centeredness and reach out to a level of consideration for
others: self-transcendence as a key form of moral education. 7 5 As for
sacrificing other values like social justice, societal welfare, and so on-values
that are indeed important in that Talmudic system too-the implication is
that those values are nevertheless secondary. Like the adjudication process
that secures them, they are fallbacks to be sought when self-transcendence
cannot be directly accomplished in the mediation process. Or maybe more
accurately, they are less direct and slower ways of accomplishing the ultimate
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goal of self-transcendence: they force people to behave as if they have concern
genuinely
for others, so that they will ultimately come to a point where they
76
have concern for others more than or as much as for themselves.
"This sort of approach," I would tell the judge, "is what the mediator is
calling for-preference for mediation over adjudication across the board,
because of its civic education value. I support this approach. I support your
trying to use it. But I don't minimize the fact that it means major changes. It
means changing completely the terms of reference in this discussion. It
means regarding mediation as a primary dispute resolution process, not an
'alternative' dispute resolution process.
It means that mediation is
presumptively applicable-and preferable-in every case, unless some cogent
argument can be presented as to why it should not be used, because it is the
surest path to self-determination and self-transcendence. It also means
I
ensuring access to court as a last resort, so
• the example
77
• that-as in
For
cited-some instrument is always available to serve the ultimate goal.
there will of course be cases where the parties cannot reach an agreement in
mediation, and where this happens there must be some secondary process
available to resolve the matter. However, turning to adjudication in such
cases does not mean that we abandon the relational values of
self-determination and self-transcendence and return to the individualist
values of the professor's vision.
"Therefore, adopting the mediator's approach also means changing the
basis of the rules of law that courts use. In other words, if we change our
choice of dispute resolution processes to conform to a different, relational
vision of society, we also have to change our theory of law to conform to that
vision of society. Otherwise, we would have a system at ideological war with
itself, fostering relational values in mediation and individualist values in
adjudication. In fact, interestingly enough, such changes in legal theory are
already emerging. Alternative theories of law based upon a relational or
communitarian theory of society are currently being written and talked
about. 78 Taking the mediator's approach means considering these theories
much more seriously within the judicial process itself.
"Finally, your Honor-and most important-if you are going to
explore this vision of mediation, it means making sure that mediation as
practiced is in fact an opportunity for self-determination and
self-transcendence on the part of the parties, and not simply a tool of
expediency. The only way to do that is to ensure -that mediators are trained
and professionally committed to these goals, and not
79 simply to using the
process as a kind of a fast-track settlement conference.
"These are very large changes in the way that things are being done
today, your Honor. I'm asking a lot from you. Still, if you're ready for those
changes, then I would say to you: Keep mediation; refer cases to mediation.
Indeed, as the mediator recommended, refer all your cases to mediation.
Because on one point the professor persuades me. I agree with him that you
cannot come up with a sound and practical screening process to sort out cases
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'unsuitable' for mediation. 8 0 As soon as you begin to do so, the exclusions will
multiply and mediation will remain a marginal instead of a primary process.
Let me put it another way. Until now, whenever mediation has been
proposed, the argument for mediation had to be made anew for each new type
of case. There was a presumption in favor of adjudication that had to be
overcome. I'd reverse that. I think the mediator has given you a compelling
argument for universal fiediation. If so, why should you try to sort cases to
limit referrals at the outset? I think her argument shifts the burden to those
who object to mediation. Let the presumption be for mediation, and let the
argument for exclusion be made separately for each type of case. There may
be reasons in some cases to override the mediator's general argument. But I'd
like to hear them first, before agreeing to any limits on using mediation.
"Let me also clarify something else, your Honor. Am I suggesting
mandatory mediation for every case, absent good cause for exemption, which
the statute here authorizes you to order? Well, the policy of preference for
mediation would support that, and therefore, so do I. 1 But even if you are
sometimes reluctant to order parties to mediation, you should still suggest
and recommend mediation to them, and offer them incentives to use it. For
just as the professor's public value argument-as he noted-cuts against any
form of public encouragement of mediation, the mediator's public value
argument supports every form of encouragement, from mandatory mediation
down to simply giving parties information about mediation and making
referrals. So yes, I advise you to use your mandatory mediation power fully;
but, in any event, do whatever you consider appropriate to encourage
mediation in every case.
"Of course, all these suggestions assume that you're prepared to make
the changes I mentioned before. If you're not prepared to make at least some
of those changes-especially, to make sure mediation really provides an
opportunity for self-determination and self-transcendence-then my advice to
you is very different. Forget mediation, your Honor. Don't touch it. Salvage
what you can of the individualist vision. Improve the courts. Don't poison the
adjudication process with some kind of fast-track settlement procedure. And
don't poison mediation by not taking it seriously.
"Now don't misunderstand me. I'm not proposing to scrap every
existing mediation program unless and until we change our whole ideology.
For example, if the Governor of New York asked me right now whether I
would support continued funding for the state's network of community dispute
resolution centers, I would tell him, 'Yes, Governor, I would.' I would do so,
because there is already a tradition among community mediators that
recognizes and tries to realize the potential of mediation for
self-determination and self-transcendence. 8 3 It may not be working perfectly,
but it is a step. The same is true in the field of family or divorce mediation.
So I'm not saying to abandon everything we've built up.
"I am saying that if you (and other decisionmakers) are going to
expand mediation and bring in lots of new cases and new people, without any
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previous tradition of educational mediation, then I want you to make that
decision not only because of the efficiency and private benefits claims, but
also-and primarily-because of the education claim. I want that included up
front. I don't deny the importance of the efficiency and private benefits
arguments for mediation; but for all the reasons given above, I think the civic
education, public value argument is far more important.
"Some people may ask: If I support mediation, then why should I care
what the reasons are for expanding it? Why should I insist on doing it only
for 'the right reasons'? Let's expand it first, and worry later about clarifying
the reasons. Well, I disagree. If we argue for mediation now solely on the
grounds of efficiency and private benefits, then even if mediation succeeds in
these dimensions, the educational dimension may never fully develop. That is
the danger of adopting these arguments as the primary rationales for public
policy. In the private sector, different versions of mediation can compete on
an equal footing, and the educational vision has at least a chance. But I am
afraid that publicly sponsored, court-connected mediation oriented towards
efficiency and private benefits alone, would crowd out other versions and
reduce the chance for the educational vision to develop.
"So, your Honor, if you are not interested in the educational
dimension, leave mediation to the private sector. I do believe that mediation
has the potential to play an important role in, perhaps even revitalize, our
public justice system-but only if it is taken seriously.85 If not, I'd
recommend that you leave it alone. I don't know if there's anyone out there in
the private sector who is interested in looking upon mediation in the way it's
been presented here; but there may be. There may be people who are
interested in mediation, not just for the better results it offers us as
individuals, but for the better lives it offers us as fellow citizens. I still have
some hope that, whether as a public policy in court or as a private choice in
the market, mediation can fulfill its potential to help change our moral vision
and change ourselves. I hope your decision will help make that possible, your
Honor. But at least, I hope it won't make it impossible."
That is what I would say to the judge-for now, at least. And that is
where I close this installment of the conversation. And I throw it open to you,
reader. For other voices are surely needed to continue this conversation.
After all this, what would you say?
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In keeping with the colloquial origin of this essay and with the dialogic
1.
format of the presentation, I have intentionally employed an informal and
conversational style throughout. I believe this works best to convey the ideas
presented in the format chosen. I thank the editors for their willingness to
accept this variance from standard academic style. The only exception to this
informality is the notes, which are intended to ground the exercise in the
reality of the current alternative dispute resolution (ADR) commentary and
to show that while the conversation may be imaginary, it is entirely
plausible.
2.
I mean to suggest that this discussion has been, at times, quite passionate.
See, e.g., Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss,
Settlement]; Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 Yale L.J. 1669 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss,
Eden]; McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale L.J. 1660 (1985);
Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 Yale L.J. 998 (1979); Resnik,
FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494
(1986). I believe that this passion can only be explained by differences over
ideology, not by differences over the relative effectiveness, cost, etc. of
different processes.
3.
On the adjudication side there has been considerable clarity. See, e.g., Fiss,
Settlement, supra note 2; Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms]; Fiss, The Social and Political
Foundationsof Adjudication, 6 L. & Hum. Behav. 121 (1982) [hereinafter
Fiss, Foundations];Resnik, supra note 2; Resnik, PrecludingAppeals, 70
Cornell L. Rev. 603 (1985) [hereinafter Resnik, Appeals]; Resnik, Due Process:
A Public Vision, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 405 (1987) [hereinafter Resnik, Due
Process]. On the mediation side a few writers have approached the
ideological dimension. See, e.g., Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute
Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 Den.
L. Rev. 335, 370-79 (1989); McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 2; Riskin,
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29 (1982) [hereinafter Riskin,
Mediation]; Riskin, Toward New Standardsfor the NeutralLawyer in
Mediation, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 329 (1984) [hereinafter Riskin, Standards].The
ideological dimension needs to be framed more clearly, however, if it is to
carry any weight in the ongoing discussion of the two processes.
While the conversation presented here concerns the choice between
adjudication and mediation, the arguments regarding mediation apply to
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other ADR processes as well. Despite very significant differences between
mediation and, for example, arbitration and negotiation variants like
mini-trial, there are also important similarities. Most important for this
essay is the point that all these processes, in different ways, make the parties
responsible for important process or outcome decisions and require the
parties explicitly or implicitly to find and accept compromise solutions.
Brunet summarizes the literature regarding these general characteristics of
ADR processes. See Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 62 Tulane L. Rev. 1, 11-14 (1987). Thus, to some extent
mediation serves in this essay as a surrogate for ADR processes generally.
4.
See Fla. Stat. Sec. 44.302 (1987); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. Secs.
154.021-.023 (Vernon 1987). Both of these statutes empower judges to order
mediation in any civil case. Other statutes restrict this power to certain types
of cases, such as divorce or malpractice. See generally, Standing Committee
on Dispute Resolution, Amer. Bar Ass'n., State Legislation on Dispute
Resolution (1988). See also infra note 6.
5.
See infra notes 22, 30-34 and accompanying text.
6.
Note that although the conversation here assumes that the choice between
the two processes is to be made by a judge under a mandatory ADR statute,
this scenario is representative of the broader problem of making public policy
choices between different dispute resolution processes. The questions facing
our judge are also faced, for example, by judges when ADR agreements or
statutes are challenged in litigation, and by legislators and administrators
when statutes or regulations mandating or encouraging ADR are proposed in
the first place. In all these cases, public decision-makers must choose
between different processes on public policy grounds. Thus, the arguments
expressed later in this conversation apply equally to all these
decisionmakers, and the choices facing them also have the ideological
dimension discussed here.
7.
Both of these propositions are voiced by commentators. See, e.g., Burger,
Isn't There
a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982); Fox, Settlement: HelpingLawyers
to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129, 142 (1971); Galanter, The
Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 Judicature 257
(1986) [hereinafter Galanter, Emergence]; Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950,
956-57 (1979). However, empirical research has raised questions about the
cost-saving effectiveness of mediated settlements. See, e.g., Galanter,

"' .

.A

Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge": JudicialMediation in the United
States, 12 J. L. & Soc'y 1, 8-10 (1985) [hereinafter Galanter, Judicial
Mediation];Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 485, 493-98 (1985).
8.
This proposition is frequently expressed by commentators. See, e.g.,
Delgado,
Fairnessand Formality:Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wisc. L. Rev. 1359, 1387-89; Fiss, Settlement, supra
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note 2, at 1076-78; Nader, supra note 2, at 1019-21; Resnik, supra note 2, at
544-46.
9.
This is the conventional wisdom regarding the two processes. See, e.g., Ad
Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dispute Resolution 10 (1984)
[hereinafter Paths];Fuller, Mediation:Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 305, 307-10, 330-33 (1971); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70
F.R.D. 111, 120-24 (1977); Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing:Mediation
and Conciliation,26 Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 2 10-11 (Supp. 1978).
10. My colleague Joseph Stulberg pointed out to me that the mediator in her
comment here avoids replying to the law clerk's point about the importance of
fairness and rights protection in most cases. Some mediation advocates do
seem simply to avoid the rights/fairness question. Most, however, do
acknowledge the issue. They typically argue that it should be dealt with
either by screening of cases to avoid mediation where rights and fairness are
major concerns, See, e.g., Paths, supra note 9, at 14-15; Sander, supra note 9,
at 130-33, or by the introduction of a protective element into the mediation
process itself. See, e.g., Riskin, Standards,supra note 3, at 330-33. In the
case of the present conversation, however, as will become clear, the mediator
is doing neither of these. Rather, she is moving gradually to a more radical
argument rarely expressed in response to the rights/fairness issue: that these
are never the most important goals. See infra text accompanying notes 44-50.
Given this "extreme" position, avoiding a direct response here and reaching
the point only gradually is a strategic decision.
11.
The "superior results" argument is a very common theme in the literature.
See, e.g., Galanter, JudicialMediation, supra note 7, at 2-4 (citing various
federal judges); Goldberg, Green & Sander, ADR Problems and Prospects:
Looking to the Future, 69 Judicature 291, 293 (1986); Lieberman & Henry,
Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
424, 429-31 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 504-05; Riskin,
Mediation, supra note 3, at 34. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
12.
See supra note 6. Again, note that the same argument applies to other
public policymakers, including legislators and public administrators, faced
with decisions regarding use of mediation and other ADR processes. And the
arguments made here are equally relevant to them.
13.
See Bush, The Economic Significance of Access to Justice, in III Access to
Justice 193, 224-27 & 225 n.30 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1979); Landes
& Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.Legal Stud. 235, 240-41 (1979).
14.
One or more of these four values are frequently stressed by writers
supporting adjudication. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 8 (stressing civil
rights and social justice); Fiss, Settlement, supra note 2, and Fiss,
Foundations, supra note 3 (stressing social justice and solidarity); Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J.
Legal Stud. 399 (1973) (stressing efficiency); Nader, supra note 2 (stressing
efficiency and social justice); Resnik, supra note 2, and Resnik, Due Process,

J. Contemp. Legal Issues Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution
and Ideology: an Imaginary Conversation
[3: 1, 1989-1990]

supra note 3 (stressing civil rights and social solidarity). See generally, Bush,
supra note 3, at 347-53 and nn. 33-34.
15.
See Brunet, supra note 3, at 15-27, for this argument.
16.
This argument derives from law and economics theory. See, e.g., Posner,
supra note 14; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32-34
(1972).
Many authors so argue. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 8, at 1367-75,
17.
1385-91; Fiss, Settlement, supra note 2, at 1076-78, 1085-87, 1089-90; Nader,
supra note 2, at 10 18-21.
18.
The foremost exponent of this argument is probably Professor Resnik. See
Resnik, supra note 2, at 545-46; Resnik, Appeals, supra note 3, at 609-11.
19.
Professor Fiss makes this point most clearly, but others also suggest it.
See Fiss, Forms, supra note 3, at 1-5, 28-36; Fiss, Foundations,supra note 3,
at 124-28; Resnik, Due Process,supra note 3, at 413-14, 417-20.
20. The conventional wisdom is that rule application and articulation are very
muted in mediation and other ADR processes. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 3,
at 13-14. Still, the professor's argument here is probably a bit exaggerated,
for argumentative effect. Most scholars acknowledge that substantive rules
do get considered in ADR processes, even if they are not determinative. A few
even argue that ADR processes like mediation can generate rules for future
application. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 7; Eisenberg,
Private Ordering Through Negotiation:Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 649-53 (1976). Still, the professor's remark is fairly
close to the conventional view.
21.
The feasibility of sorting and channelling cases is a key assumption of
many who favor mediation for certain types of disputes, but is as yet
unproven. See infra notes 30 & 34 and accompanying texts. The argument
that the assumption is unsound has been voiced by various ADR critics. See,
e.g., Fiss, Settlement, supra note 2, at 1087-89. If the assumption is unsound,
then mediation advocates must find a justification for preferring mediation to
adjudication across the board. This is what the mediator does in this
conversation.
22.
Consider the three types of cases the law clerk would refer to mediation.
Regarding landlord-tenant disputes, see infra text accompanying notes 42-43,
for the professor's account of how such disputes can include all four of the key
public values. As for divorce disputes, these were perhaps the first non-labor
cases to be considered suitable for mediation. Lon Fuller, in his seminal 1971
article on mediation, points specifically to-family disputes as the heartland of
mediation's "jurisdiction". See Fuller, supra note 9, at 330-34. Since then,
divorce mediation has steadily grown, on the assumption that it serves the
relationship-centered goals that are important in those cases. See, e.g.,
Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alternative, in Alternative Means
of Family Dispute Resolution 43 (Amer. Bar Ass'n. 1982); Winks, Divorce
Mediation:A Non-adversaryProcedurefor the No-Fault Divorce, 19 J. Fam.
L. 615 (1981). Yet, as critics have long noted, divorce cases frequently involve
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parties of unequal wealth and power, so that social justice concerns are
raised. See, e.g., Ange, Mediation:Panaceaor Placebo?,N.Y. St. B. J., May
1985, at 6. Important rights of both parents and children are invariably at
stake in divorce, so rights protection is also important. And the resolution of
these cases may well offer the opportunity to give meaning to important
public values regarding family structure, gender equality, etc... In short,
several of the professor's values are clearly involved in divorce cases, despite
the conventional wisdom that such cases belong in mediation. Finally, even
in commercial cases between equal parties, both social justice and societal
welfare may be at stake, especially if a settlement that benefits the parties
may have adverse consequences for outsiders. See Susskind, Environmental
Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (1981); Bush, supra
note 3, at 372-73. It is simply hard to find cases where the professor's values
are not important.
23.
See supra notes 6 & 12.
24.
In fact, if public values and benefits are involved, purely private choice of
dispute resolution processes may be inappropriate. More specifically, some
method of ensuring that private choice takes account of public values may be
appropriate. See Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil
Justice, 1984 Wisc. L. Rev. 893, 1014-23. See also infra notes 46 & 81-82.
25.
See, e.g., McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1664-66; Riskin, Mediation,
supra note 3, at 30, 56-57; Riskin, Standards, supra note 3, at 331-32, 353-57;
Smith, supra note 9, at 208-10.
26.
See Fiss, Eden, supra note 2, for just this sort of reaction.
27.
See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 8; Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1986); Fiss, Settlement, supra
note 2; Nader, supra note 2; Resnik, supra note 2. In fact, the professor's
voice is a composite of all of the cited authors' views.
28.
Both here and in connection with the mediation advocates, I use the term
"orthodoxy" to contrast this view with a "pluralistic" view of dispute
resolution processes. Pluralists believe that both adjudicatiqn and mediation
have their uses, that each is preferable in different types of cases. See infra
text accompanying note 30. Orthodoxy holds that one process-adjudication
or mediation, depending on the direction of the orthodoxy-is always (or
almost always) preferable, regardless of the type of case. Thus orthodoxy
views one process as the primary process across the board, though the other
may still have secondary importance. Also implicit in the term "orthodoxy" is
the notion that the preference for a given process is based on some set of
values perceived as having universal and not merely situational application.
See Bush, supra note 3, at 370-74. While not all of the authors I call
"orthodox" take a completely universalist approach, I read all of them (in
differing degrees) as inclining towards this approach rather than a really
pluralistic one. Readers can test this reading for themselves.
29.
See, e.g., Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976); Burger, supra note 7; Fox, supra note 7;
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Levin & Colliers, Containingthe Cost of Litigation, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 219
(1985); Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation:Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Plan, and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
37 Rutgers L. Rev. 253 (1985).
30.
This position is by far more popular today than either of the orthodoxies.
See, e.g., S. Goldberg, E. Green & F. Sander, Dispute Resolution 7-13 (1985);
L. Riskin & J. Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 452-54 (1987);
Fuller, supra note 9, at 307, 333-39; Goldberg, Green & Sander, supra note
11, at 295-97; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 486, 498-506; Paths,supra
note 9, at 8-16 & Table 5; Sander, supra note 9, at 130-33. Despite the
growing popularity of this approach, I am unaware of anyone who has
actually succeeded in developing a realistic and effective method for
screening and matching different types of cases to different processes. For a
critique of the feasibility of rational process matching, see Esser, Evaluations
of Dispute Processing:We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think
What We Know, 66 Den. L. Rev. 499 (1989). For this reason, although I
myself advocated a pluralist approach at one time and even proposed a fairly
detailed model for effectuating it, see Bush, supra note 24, I have since come
to question both the feasibility and the appropriateness of this approach. See
Bush, supra note 3, at 370-74.
31.
See, e.g., Bush, supra note 3, at 374-79; McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 2.
Some commentators take the pluralist position explicitly, but still express
what might be called an orthodox spirit-i.e., a strong sense of the unique
value of mediation in many different types of cases. My colleague Leonard
Riskin is one example. See supra note 30; Riskin & Westbrook, Integrating
Dispute Resolution into StandardFirst Year Courses: The MissouriPlan, 39
J. Legal Educ. 509 (1989); Riskin, Mediation, supra note 3, at 35; Riskin,
Standards, supra note 3, at 330. In my own work, there has been a gradual
evolution towards an orthodox mediation position, culminating in this essay.
See Bush, supra note 24, at 968-71, 995-1004, 1026-32; Bush, supra note 3, at
370-79.
32.
This may be so simply because, as the mediator here admits, it is hard to
articulate clearly the public values argument, and because the private benefit
argument is much easier to sell.
33.
But see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
34.
See Esser, supra note 30; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 505-06;.supra
note 30.
35.
See Brunet, supra note 3, at 1-2, 11-12, 17, 27; Bush, Efficiency and
Protection,or Empowerment and Recognition?:The Mediator'sRole and
Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 253, 259-60 (1989); Riskin,
Mediation,supra note 3,
at 41-42, 51.
36.
See, e.g., McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 2; Riskin, Mediation, supra note
3; Riskin, Standards, supra note 3. For an example of how the argument is
summarily dismissed, see Fiss, Eden, supra, note 2.
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37.
This is the direction urged, for example, in Nader, supra note 2.
See Bush, supra note 35, for a detailed treatment of what this different
38.
version of mediation might look like.
39. See Bush, supra note 3, at 370-79; Esser, supra note 30, at 534-43; Riskin,
Mediation, supra note 3, at 56-57. I note that some writers explicitly reject
the notion that the choice between adjudication and mediation represents a
choice between fundamentally different values or ideologies. See
Menkel-Meadow, DisputeResolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69
Judicature 300, 301 (1986).
40. Professor Menkel-Mea-Iow noted in her remarks at one dispute resolution
conference that criticisms of mediation often come from individuals who have
never observed or experienced the process. Remarks of Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Workshop on Identifying and Measuring the Quality of
Dispute Resolution Processes and Outcomes, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison
(July 13-14, 1987). I took from this the implication, with which I strongly
agree, that direct experience of mediation helps to provide answers to
questions raised about the process. This notion, and Menkel-Meadow's
remarks, suggested to me the idea of imagining mediation advocates and
critics observing the process together and comparing their interpretations of
what they saw.
41. The version or approach to mediation that our mediator advocates is one
in which "... the mediator's role is to encourage the parties' exercise of their
autonomy and independent choice in deciding whether and how to resolve the
dispute, and to promote their mutual recognition of each other as fellow
human beings despite their conflict." Bush, supra note 35, at 258. I have
called this the "empowerment-and-recognition" approach to mediation and
described its operation in some detail; I have also argued that it is the most
coherent and responsible approach for mediators to take. See Bush, supra
note 35, at 270-73, 277-83. Other mediation theorists also describe and
endorse this approach to mediation. See, e.g., Folberg, supra note 22; Fuller,
supra note 9; Riskin, Standards,supra note 3; J. Stulberg, Taking
Charge/Managing Conflict (1987).
However, as our mediator notes, not all mediators presently take this
approach; some employ approaches that focus on settlement per se as the
goal, or protection of rights, or finding the "optimal" solution to the dispute.
See Bush, supra note 35, at 259-62, 268 & n. 41; Folger & Bernard, Divorce
Mediation:When Mediators Challenge the DivorcingParties,Mediation Q.,
Dec. 1985, at 5. Some of these approaches, like the "optimization" or
"maximization" approach, see Riskin, Standards,supra note 3, at 358-59,
implicitly share the empowerment and recognition approach's concern for
encouraging mutual recognition, even if the mediator may take a more
directive role. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Later in the
conversation here I call the empowerment and recognition and similar
approaches "educational" mediation. See infra text accompanying notes
46-50, 67-79. The mediator's public value argument rests on the assumption
that mediators in practice will follow an empowerment and recognition or
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similar educational approach. See infra text accompanying note 79. The
reason for this assumption is that other versions of mediation tend to further
either private benefit or expediency goals, as the professor contends; they
therefore cannot support a public value argument.
42. My use of this type of case as the vehicle for presenting the mediator's
view of the process should not be taken to mean that this view applies only to
landlord-tenant or "neighborhood" disputes like those typically mediated at
community dispute resolution centers. The trivalization of mediation by
assuming it has value only for a few types of cases is common but, in my
view, wrong. See Fiss, Eden, supra note 2, at 1661-71. I believe that
mediation could, in any of the types of cases first described, achieve the goals
that the mediator sees as paramount. See infra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
43. Professor Resnik's concern about the privacy of mediation seems based on
this kind of argument. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 553-54; Resnik, Due
Process, supra note 3, at 417-20.
44.
I have arranged for the mediator to sidestep what I call the "effectiveness"
argument, i.e., whether adjudication or mediation is more effective at
achieving the public values the professor proffers. This argument is not part
of the ideological dimension, for it assumes a single ideology, see infra text
accompanying note 53, and simply asks which process serves it more
effectively. However, as the mediator implies, there are numerous grounds on
which to challenge the professor's reading of mediation as ineffective, and his
implication of adjudication as effective, in this regard. See, e.g., Bush, supra
note 24, at 978-86, 972-1004; Goldberg, Green & Sander, supra note 11, at
292-94.
45.
The mediator's description of what she saw assumes that the mediator of
the case took the empowerment-and-recognition or educational approach to
the mediation process. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. As noted
there, some mediators take different approaches focusing on settlement,
rights protection, etc. If this case had been handled by a mediator taking one
of these other approaches, our mediator would probably not have seen what
she describes, and her argument would lose its factual foundation. Thus, her
public value argument is valid only if mediators in practice follow an
educational approach. See infra text accompanying note 79.
46.
Economic theory maintains that where a large part of the benefit from a
certain good is social benefit not exclusively enjoyed by the
consumer-so-called "external benefit-he will be less likely to purchase the
good, or to purchase as much of it. The result is both underconsumption and
underproduction of such "mixed goods" in private markets. See Bush, supra
note 13, at 206-220. Education is a classic example of such a mixed good. See
id. I have argued elsewhere that dispute resolution in general is also a mixed
good. See Bush, supra note 24, at 1014-18. Where dispute resolution and
education combine, as the mediator argues is the case in mediation, private
economic actors are quite likely to undervalue the good and pass it by,
despite potentially great public benefit. This helps to explain the
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"surprisingly" low demand for private mediation. See Golberg, Green &
Sander, supra note 11, at 291. It also supplies a justification for public
encouragement of mediation-through mandatory referral, subsidization,
etc.-rather than exclusive reliance on individual choices in the private
market. See Bush, supra note 24, at 1018-23. See also supra note 24, infra
notes 81-82.
47.
On the relative priority of these two aspects of the education mediation
provides, see infra note 56. On the connection between mediation and the
moral value of recognition of other, or self-transcendence, see Kuflik, Morality
and Compromise, in Nomos XXI: Compromise in Ethics, Law and Politics 38,
48-54 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
48.
See supra note 46.
49. As noted above, see supra note 42, the mediator's argument could apply to
any type of case. The details of the parties' realizations about their own
capacities and the other party's humanity would of course differ; but the
general character and effect of the experience would be similar. Even in
personal injury disputes between strangers, and even in disputes between
corporate parties, the potential for the mediator's vision is present. This is so
because, for the individuals actually in the mediation room, opportunities for
growth in self-determination and self-transcendence are present in almost
every type of case. Of course, as noted earlier, potential impacts on rights,
social justice, efficiency or solidarity are also likely to be present in almost
any type of case. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Therefore, the
professor's and mediator's contrasting views described above could apply
equally to the mediation of almost any type of dispute. The argument
transcends context. See Bush, supra note 3.
Regarding mediation's unique potential for the kind of education described,
Leonard Riskin rightly pointed out to me that "problem-solving negotiation"
also has potential in this regard. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View
of Legal Negotiation:The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
754 (1984). However, he also noted-and I strongly agree-that it is much
easier to bring about such education in the mediation process. See Bush,
supra note 35, at 277-83, for a discussion of why this is so.
50.
The mediator's re-interpretation here of the "superior results" argument
suggests that this argument has an ambiguous character, and that it may
carry different meanings depending upon who is advancing it. In particular,
it may be either a private benefit argument, as the professor characterized it
earlier, or a public value argument, as the mediator frames it here. In
deciding how much weight to give this argument, it is surely important to
clarify which interpretation is intended. However, the key point here is to
recognize that the superior results claim is not necessarily a private benefit
argument and that it may therefore be part of the public-value, ideological
dimension of the discussion. An additional point is that mediators whose
approach is to focus on finding integrative solutions, even without much
emphasis on promoting self-determination and consideration of other in the
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process per se, can still be seen as taking an educational approach. See supra
notes 41 & 45.
51.
See Fiss, Eden, supra note 2.
52.
See J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 1-6 (1969).
53.
See Bush, supra note 3, at 374-75 & nn.73-74; Bush, Between Two Worlds:
The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causationof
Injury, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1473, 1521-23 (1986); Murphy, Liberalismand
PoliticalSociety, 26 Am. J. Juris. 125, 125-26, 130-41 (1981).
54.
See Bush, supra note 3, at 340-41, 376-77; Bush, supra note 53, at 1540-41.
55.
See id., at 1521-23, 1532-39.
56.
Also, in my view, these values are interconnected and stand in a certain
priority relative to one another, in which self-transcendence is the higher
value. Specifically, self-determination is a necessary first step in civic and
moral development which prepares and gives the individual the opportunity
for the ultimate step of transcending the self, in relation both to others and to
the common good. See Bush, supra note 35, at 272 & n.52. Therefore, I see
self-determination" as ultimately a relational rather than an individualistic
value, in the terms used later in the conversation. See infra text
accompanying notes 60-63.
57.
See supra note 46.
58.
See, e.g., R. Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler, & S. Tipton,
Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (1985)
[hereinafter R. Bellah].
59.
1 have taken this view elsewhere, in connection with both dispute
resolution theory and substantive legal theory. See Bush, supra note 3, at
370-79; Bush, supra note 53, at 1529-32, 1560-63.
60.
See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); R. Nozick, Anarchy,
State and Utopia (1974); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Of course, as
Joseph Stulberg commented to me, there are sharp divergences in the
account of individual rights offered by these three, and by others following
their general tradition. In fact, some have considered these divergences so
large as to call for separate identification of "libertarian" and "egalitarian"
rights theory. See, e.g., Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, New
Republic, May 7, 1984, at 15, 16. Despite these divergences, all of these
thinkers form a single tradition by comparison to the figures with whom they
are contrasted in the text.
61.
See, e.g., R. Bellah, supra note 58; C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); A. Macintyre, After
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981); M. Sandel, Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice (1982); Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism and
Community-American Style, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 900 (1985).
62.
Macneil, supra note 61, at 900 n.5.
63.
Id., at 937.
64.
The ideological argument that I find implicit in dispute resolution
discourse has, as the text notes, surfaced in many other arenas as well. In
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substantive legal theory, relational theorists have begun to challenge
traditional individualist doctrine, as for example in Thomas Shaffer's work on
legal ethics and Ian Macneil's on contracts, to mention only a few. See
Macneil, supra note 61; Macneil, Values in Contract:Internal and External,
78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 340 (1983); Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility
and Social Solidarity,96 Ethics 567 (1986); Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Radical Individualism,65 Tex. L. Rev. 963 (1987). See also, e.g., Bush, supra
note 53; Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern /Postmodern
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 999 (1988); Radin,
Property and Personhood,34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982). In jurisprudence,
Michael Sandel's critique of John Rawls work is a major instance of the
argument described here. See M. Sandel, supra note 61. In psychology, Carol
Gilligan's challenge to Kohlberg's (and others') theory of moral development
played and continues to play a key role in shaping the wider argument. See
C. Gilligan, supra note 61. Even in fields like medicine, relationally-oriented
researchers like James Lynch have questioned individualistic models of
human health and illness that Lynch traces to Pavlov and Descartes. See J.
Lynch, The Language of the Heart 279-310 (1985). Thus, the ideological
argument I describe here has penetrated many fields. We should therefore
not be surprised to find that this same argument underlies and drives the
adjudication/mediation debate, as I believe it does.
As Emily Schmeidler and others pointed out to me, my focus here on
65.
ideology as the underlying source of the dispute resolution argument
threatens to raise an old controversy once again. The conversation here
frames the issue as if the judge, after making an ideologically informed
choice, can actually effectuate that ideology in dispute resolution institutions.
Is this realistic? Does ideology shape institutions, or do institutions shape
ideology? Actually, the same question was raised in one of the seminal
exchanges in ADR scholarship. See Danzig & Lowy, Everyday Disputes and
Mediation in the United States:A Reply to ProfessorFelstiner,9 L. & Soc'y
Rev. 675 (1975); Felstiner, Influences of Social Organizationon Dispute
Processing,9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 63 (1974); Felstiner, Avoidance as Dispute
Processing:AnElaboration,9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 695 (1975). My argument here
does not assume any simple answer to this difficult question. Rather, it
assumes a complex and dynamic relation between ideology and institutions,
together with a certain interpretation of social structures in the United
States. More specifically, I believe that the current interest in relational
ideology-in dispute resolution and elsewhere, see supra note 64-is not a
spontaneous intellectual invention but rather a reflection of relational
structures already existing at different levels in our society. As Thomas
Shaffer has argued, relational structures do exist today at many levels, even
if their form differs from that of the past. See Shaffer, supra note 64. My
view is that current relational ideology has to a large extent been inspired by
these structures. It is not a disembodied yearning for the past, but an
expression of important aspects of the present. Institutions do shape
ideology: they have shaped the emerging relational ideology itself. However,
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the connection also runs the other way. Ideology also shapes institutions;
and in the mixed environment of our society, relational ideology can support
and strengthen the position and significance of relational structures. In this
way, I believe, ideological awareness-on the judge's part and that of others
involved with mediation-can indeed affect dispute resolution institutions.
66.
The question of choice versus integration was raised by several
participants in the original colloquium at Rutgers, particularly by Professor
Nadine Taub. Related to this issue is another question raised at Rutgers by
Professor J. Hyman. The view presented here is that each process is linked
with one of the competing ideologies: mediation is inherently relational, and
adjudication inherently individualist. The notion of a fundamental link
between processes and underlying values is not new. Nevertheless, some see
it as oversimplified. Hyman, for example, argues that individualist values
like rights protection and social justice can be served in mediation, and
relational values like self-transcendence in adjudication, depending on the
role mediators and advocates adopt in these processes. Therefore, whatever
our vision, we need not choose a single process to effectuate it. See J. Hyman,
Letter to the author dated October 27, 1988; see also Hyman, TrialAdvocacy
and Methods of Negotiation:Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?,
34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 863 (1987). I think this view is overly optimistic. While
each process is adaptable, there are limits on that adaptability. Mediation
can protect rights and social justice, but the more it does so the less likely it
is to promote self-determination and self-transcendence. Advocacy in
adjudication can seek to encourage self-transcendence, but the more it does
so the less likely it is to protect rights and justice. These tradeoffs are at
some level unavoidable: as we adapt each process to further different values,
we reduce its capacity to further the values it originally served. Fuller's work
on adjudication and mediation, and Fiss' and Resnik's on adjudication, seem
to rest on a similar view. See Fiss, Foundations,supra note 3; Fiss,
Settlement, supra note 2; Fuller, supra note 9; Fuller, The Forms and Limits
ofAdjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978); Resnik, supra note 2. Thus,
while my either/or approach may seem too simple, it highlights a basic
problem of choice or priority that other approaches tend to obscure.
67.
For suggestions along these lines from various ADR critics, see Brunet,
supra note 3, at 48-54; Delgado, supra note 8, at 1402-04; Edwards, supra
note 27, at 678-82.
68.
See infra text accompanying note 79.
69. The result could be to support instead what I have called a collectivist or
corporate vision of society in which the greatest good is the collective welfare
of society as a whole or some specific class within it. See Bush, supra note 3,
at 375-76. See also Macneil, supra note 61, who posits another alternative to
the individualist and community visions which he calls the "bureaucratic"
vision.
70.
See, e.g., Levin & Colliers, supra note 29, at 248-51; Peckham, supra note
29, at 274-77.
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71.
See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 3; Delgado, supra note 8.
72.
See The Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah), Book of Judges, Laws
Concerningthe Sanhedrin(Courts), Ch. 22, Sec. 4 (Yale Judaica Series 1949);
The Code of Jewish Law (Civil Laws) [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat)],
Laws of Judges, Ch. 12, Sec. 2 (untranslated). In translations of the
traditional sources, "compromise" is often translated as "arbitration". In fact,
the actual process is much more like mediation than arbitration. See infra
note 73. See also Elon, Compromise, inThe Principles of Jewish Law 570,
571-2 (M. Elon ed. 1975); Shine, Compromise, in Jewish Law and Current
Legal Problems 77, 79-80 (Rakoner ed. 1984).
73.
The rabbinical court settlement process can be described as follows. First,
after taking formal jurisdiction of the case, the court tries to persuade the
parties to agree to compromise settlement instead of strict adjudication. If
they reject this entirely, the court proceeds to adjudicate the case. If they
accept the compromise approach, the court listens to both parties and
proposes a settlement that takes into account both the legal arguments and
the "human circumstances". The court then tries to persuade both parties to
accept this settlement, talking with them separately if necessary. If the
parties offer counter-proposals, the court works with these, continuing until
agreement or impasse is reached. In effect,-this part of the process is a
version of mediation, but one in which the mediator is responsible for making
the initial proposal and for ensuring some level of fairness in the final
settlement. An additional complication is that, since the court has an
obligation to resolve the case once it takes jurisdiction, failure to reach
agreement through mediation leads to one of two results. If the parties
formally committed themselves at the outset to accept a compromise, the
court imposes a compromise settlement derived from the discussions. If there
was no such commitment at the outset, the court reverts to the role of
adjudicator and renders a strictly legal decision. In effect, then, the process
as a whole could be described as either mediation/arbitration, or
mediation/adjudication. See S. Goldberg, E. Green, & F. Sander, supra note
30, at 246-71. Either way, the first phase of the process is clearly
mediational. The foregoing description is based on an interview with Rabbi
Chaim Kohn, New York, N.Y., Nov. 9, 1989, clarifying the author's
understanding of untranslated commentaries on the rabbinical court's
obligation to seek compromise settlement.
74.
See The Role of the Judge, in Shiurei Harav: a Conspectus of the Public
Lectures of Rabbi Joseph P. Soleveitchik 81, 82 (1974) [hereinafter Role of the
Judge I ("Compromise is the ideal legal solution, not strict adherence to
legality."); Maimonides' Introduction to the Talmud 122-23 (Judaica Press
1975) ("[The judge]... must strive, in all his cases, to formulate a settlement,
and if he can refrain from passing a verdict his entire life, constantly
formulating a fair settlement between the litigants-how wonderfully
pleasant that is!"). The actual codified requirement that the judge attempt to
effectuate a compromise states explicitly, "The court that always succeeds in
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effecting a settlement is praiseworthy... ." Maimonides' Code of Jewish Law,
supra note 72.
75.
See Role of the Judge, supra note 74, at 82-83 (In compromise,... both
litigants give up something," and compromise ... . brings peace by getting the
litigants to retreat. The judge is changed from a magistrate to a teacher.
The judge makes the litigants see that neither was totally right nor wrong.
This is not merely a judicial decision-it is enlightenment."); Bush,
Traditional Jewish Ethics and Modern Dispute Resolution Choices, in
Siyumei Rambam Celebrations (1986). See also supra notes 47 & 56.
76. To put it differently, mediation offers parties the opportunity to choose to
act selflessly-i.e., to show concern for others-in some manner. If agreement
cannot be reached because one or both parties cling to their self-interest, then
legal rules are applied to force parties to respect others. Both social-justice
rules (e.g., the implied warranty of habitability) and societal-welfare rules
(e.g., the negligence rule) can be viewed as rules compelling respect for
others. If we assume that attitudes not only influence but are influenced by
actions, then compelling respectful actions can eventually engender
respectful attitudes. In a relational system, therefore, mediation and
adjudication serve the same end. Mediation offers the chance to attain that
end more directly and is thus preferable. But where it does not fully succeed,
then adjudication steps in to pursue the end indirectly. See infra text
accompanying notes 77-78.
77.
See supra note 73. In the rabbinical court system, the court must, if
mediation does not produce a settlement, render a decision.
78.
See supra note 64.
79.
See supra notes 41 & 45; Bush, supra note 35.
80. See supra text accompanying note 22; see also supra note 30.
81.
I do not believe there is anything inherently contradictory about
mandatory mediation. Coercion to get the parties into the room does not
prevent voluntariness thereafter, nor does it seem to destroy mediation's
potential for promoting self-determination and self-transcendence. See, e.g.,
McEven & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical
Assessment, 33 Me. L. Rev. 237 (1981). Moreover, some public compulsion or
inducement may be necessary as a practical matter, both to overcome the
parties' lack of information-and therefore suspicion-about the process, see
Sander, Family Mediation:Problems and Prospects,Mediation Q., Dec. 1983,
at 3, 10-11, and to counteract the parties' inevitable tendency to ignore public
benefits in making private decisions about dispute resolution. See supra
notes 24 & 46 and infra note 82.
82.
Indeed, if the mediator's public value argument is accepted, then public
encouragement of mediation should extend not only to cases filed in court,
which are the immediate subject of this conversation, but to disputes that
have not yet and may never come to court. This would argue for some form of
public support, subsidy, etc., for independent (i.e., non-court-connected)
mediation services whose caseload consists of disputes brought to mediation
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prior to any legal action. See Shonholtz, The Citizen's Role in Justice:
Building a PrimaryJustice and Prevention System at the NeighborhoodLevel,
494 Annals, Nov. 1987, at 42. See also supra notes 24, 46, & 81.
83.
Although this is not exactly the intended point of their studies,
researchers have observed and conducted interviews with community
mediators that show strong evidence of this tradition. See, e.g., Harrington &
Merry, Ideological Production:the Making of Community Mediation, 22 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 709 (1988); Silbey & Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 L. &
Pol'y, Jan. 1986, at 7. See also Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation in
Alternative Dispute Processing,37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 19, 26-27 (1985).
84. See, e.g., Folberg, supra note 22; Fuller, supra note 9; Winks, supra note
22.
85.
The question of whether mediation belongs in or out of the formal court
system has sparked controversy. Ray Shonholtz, among others, has argued
quite vigorously that mediation should operate outside of, and prior to, any
contact with the legal system. See Shonholtz, supra note 82. Leonard Riskin
has argued, if I understand him correctly, that one of the potentially
important benefits of mediation is that it may change the way that the legal
system itself, and especially lawyers, function-helping to integrate values of
justice with values of caring in that system. See Riskin, Mediation,supra
note 3; Riskin, Standards,supra note 3; Riskin, supra note 83. 1 am inclined
to agree with Riskin, but only on the assumption that the mediation with
which the legal system has contact is the educational kind of mediation
discussed in this conversation. I cannot see the other versions of mediation,
see supra note 41, fostering such changes in the legal system itself.
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